The agency perspective has allowed us to understand a remarkable range of phenomena. It is the dominant theory for the study of corporations. The theory, however, in its current state of development, is limited in its explanatory power. It is capable of describing incentive provision, but it is incapable of addressing the allocation of value between the various parties to an enterprise.
INTRODUCTION
Agen cy t h eory will always be r eleva n t t o t h e discussion of t h e cor por a t ion or a n y ot h er bu sin ess en tit y.
Th e fu n da m en t al qu est ion , h owever , is n ot t h e t h eor y's via bilit y, bu t it s cor e r elevan ce t o a n expla n a tion of t h e cor por a t ion a n d corpor a te la w. Th e t h eor y, n on et h eless, a s cu r ren tly u n der st ood an d developed, is lim it ed in it s via bilit y. It ta kes a s its a xioms det ails t h a t ar e fa r fr om self-eviden t a n d a r e in n eed of fu r t h er exposition . In th is E ssa y, we will presen t a fu ller pict u r e of th e fir m an d a gen cy th eor y t h an is cu r r en t ly offer ed. Na m ely, we view t h e a ct u a l dist r ibu tion of va lu e bet ween t h e pa r t ies t o a n en ter pr ise as in capable of clea r an d object ive det erm in a t ion , by ma r ket s or oth er wise. Ra th er , t h e t en a n ts of a gen cy t h eor y, ch iefly bein g th e self-in ter est of r a tion a l, selfm a ximizin g a ct ors, lea d on e t o view t h is pr oblem a s th e pa r ticu la rized ou tcom e of cea seless n egotia t ion s.
We offer a r esolu t ion to wh a t oth erwise seems an u n en din g wa r of all a gain st a ll, by posit in g t h e n on -egoist ic con cern of t h e en t erprise's in dividu a ls for t h e or ga n iza t ion 's pu r pose. Th e a ch ievem en t of or ga n iza t ion a l goa ls r equ ir es in dividu als t o for feit t h eir a u ton om y  E dga r S. Woola r d, J r ., Cha ir in Cor por a t e Gover n a n ce a n d Dir ect or , t h e J oh n L. Wein ber g Cen t er for Cor por a t e Gover n a n ce, Un iver sit y of Dela wa r e.
 E dga r S. Woola r d, J r ., F ellow in Cor por a t e Gover n a n ce, J oh n L. Wein ber g Cen t er for Cor por a t e Gover n a n ce, Un iver sit y of Dela wa r e.
Th e a u t h or s wou ld like t o t h a n k ou r fellow Sym posiu m pa r t icipa n t s, a n d Ala n P a lm it er especia lly, for t h eir h elpfu l com m en t s . We a lso t h a n k An dr ew Ver st ein for h is det a iled a n d t h ou gh t fu l r eview a n d su ggest ion s. We a r e gr a t efu l t o An n Mu lé, Lou isa Cr esson a n d Da n iel McCa r t h y for r eviewin g ou r ea r ly dr a ft s. a n d a ccept t h e st ylized r oles a n d du ties pr oscribed t o th em by a n ou t side pa r t y so t h a t t h e or ga n iza t ion m a y fu n ction coh er en tly. 1 In its presen t con cept ion , we view a gen cy t h eory's explan a t ory ca pa bilit y for corpor a t e act ion a n d in cen tive n ot as a ll-in clu sive, bu t r a t h er en compa ssin g on ly a su bset of a br oader a n d m ore fu n da men t a l a n a lysis of t h e essen ce of t h e cor pora t ion . Agen cy t h eor y ca n a t t im es be per ceived as bein g domin a t ed by t h e t ech n icia n s a n d fin a n cia l econ om ist s wh o st u dy, st ru ct u r e, an d design compen sa t ion so t o a lign in cen tives. 2 Th e lu cidit y of t h is 1. Ou r su bsidia r y con clu sion , t h a t of a t h ir d -pa r t y a u t h or it y bein g n ecessa r y t o gover n a n ce, is in gen er a l a ccor d wit h t h e views of n ot on ly ou r a r gu m en t 's for bea r er , Th om a s H obbes, bu t a lso wit h t h ose of Ma r ga r et M. Bla ir a n d Lyn n A. St ou t , a s well a s St eph en M. Ba in br idge. S ee gen erally St eph en M. (1999) . Ou r r ea son s for dr a win g t h is con clu sion a r e n on et h eless dist in ct . Th a t we h a ve r ea ch ed t h is su bsidia r y poin t in com m on , a n d t h a t , in a ddit ion , ou r a r gu m en t s h a ve t u r n ed on som e com m on poin t s a s well, is su r ely en cou r a gin g. Ou r pla ce of diver gen ce lies a ft er t h is poin t of a dva n ce, wit h t h e fin a l con clu sion con cer n in g t h e a ppr opr ia t e en ds of cor por a t e gover n a n ce.
Ba in br idge, Director Prim acy: T h e M ean s an d E n d s of Corporate
As t o t h e en ds, t h e a u t h or it y or discr et ion of t h e gover n i n g t h ir d pa r t y, wh ich we posit a s n ecessa r y t o coh er en t or ga n iza t ion , m u st be given som e pu r pose, or decision -cr it er ia , a ccor din g t o wh ich it ca n expr ess it self. Bla ir a nd St ou t pr opose t h a t t h is "m edia t in g hier a r ch " sh ou ld "ba la n ce t ea m m em ber s ' com pet in g in t er est s." Bla ir & St ou t , su pra a t 281. Alon e, t h is ph r a se la cks m ea n in g a n d pr ovides n o a ct u a l gu ida n ce wit h ou t fu r t h er specifica t ion ; equ a lit y, per h a ps, is wh a t is m ea n t , or som e ot h er t u n in g m ech a n ism , a n a logou s t o t h a t syst em of pr in ciples wh er e a la r ge object m igh t "ba la n ce" a sm a ller object a t t h e ot h er en d of a seesa w of cer t a in pr opor t ion s, m a y be in t en ded. Wit h a sligh t r efin em en t , t h ey a r gu e t h a t t h is "ba la n ce" sh ou ld keep "ever yon e h a ppy en ou gh t h a t t h e pr odu ct ive coa lit ion st a ys t oget h er , " id.; bu t sh ou ld on e ever be h a ppier t h a n "en ou gh ?" Wh er e sh ou ld t h e r eposit or y of u n spen t h a ppin ess r eside? Th ey h it closer t o t h e m a r k wh en t h ey su ggest t h a t t h e r ole of t h is t h ir d pa r t y is t o pr ot ect t h e cor por a t e coa lit ion -t h er eby iden t ifyin g a n idea l of h a r m on y wit h a cor por a t e will-to-exist a s t h e pr oper pu r pose. Id. a t 283. Th is pr oposit ion is m or e cor r ect . We wou ld a r gu e, a s will becom e a ppa r en t in t h is essa y, t h a t t h e cor por a t ion 's exist en ce t om or r ow depen ds on su r plu s t om or r ow, a n d m or e su r plu s m ea n s on ly m or e su r et y of t h is fa vor a ble ou t com e-gr ow t h e pie! Th is a n d "pr ot ect ion of t h e cor por a t e coa lit ion " a r e t o u s n ea r ly syn on ym ou s wit h "sh a r eh older wea lt h m a xim iza t ion ," con t r a st a keh older -ism , given t h e n a t u r e of t h e m a r ket (a s der ived fr om con su m er pr efer en ce).
2. We h er e r efer t o t h e st a n da r d a gen cy t h eor y con cept u a liza t ion fr om fin a n ce lit er a t u r e. S ee gen erally St eph en A. Ross, Th e E con om ic Th eor y of Agen cy: Th e P r in cipa l's P r oblem , 63 AM. E CON. REV. 134 (1973) (a n ea r ly for m a liza t ion of t h e pr in cipa l-a gen t pr oblem ); Ben gt H olm st r om , M oral H azard an d Observability, 10 BELL J. E CON. 74 (1979) (exa m in in g a for m u la t ion for efficien t con t r a ct in g bet ween pr in cipa l a n d a gen t ba sed on va r iou s a ssu m pt ions a bou t t h e a gen cy r ela t ion sh ip);. Th e va lu e of com pen sa tion is a ssum ed t o be equ a l t o a n a gen t 's pa r t icipa t ion con st r a in t , or oppor t u n it y cost , wh ich is set by m a r ket s. S ee id . Ou r m odifica t ion wou ld be: com pen sa t ion is equiva len t t o t h e pa r t icipa t ion con st r a in t an d su r plu s. Th e a m ou n t of s u r plu s is n ot set by m a r ket s. If ou r view is cor r ect , t h e a m ou n t of su r plu s is det er m in ed su ch t h a t a n a lysis, with its prin cipals, a gen ts, a n d m a r ket s, a n d it s a ppa r en t object ivit y, obscu r es a fu n da men t al t ru t h . Con flict in g in t er ests r equ ir e n ot ju st st r u ctu r ed in cen t ives, bu t a lso, in th e en d, a det erm in a t ion of h ow va lu e is dist r ibu t ed. F or a ll of t h e m eth od t h a t a gen cy-t ech n icia n s a r e a ble t o apply, t h ey ca n n ot a n swer t h e qu est ion of wh o gets wh a t , or pr ecisely h ow mu ch -a lth ou gh th ey ca n well a n swer h ow.
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Th ere is a con st an t ba t t le bet ween th e con stit u en cies wh o form t h e en terpr ise over t h e appr opr ia t e dist r ibu tion of va lu e. A bet t er expla n a t ion of t h e corpora t ion en compa sses th is r ea liza t ion . We su ggest a poten t ia l r esolu tion to t h is con flict in t h e for m of br oad-based equ it y own er sh ip a mon g t h e in t ern a l corpor a te con st it u en cies.
I. THE AUTHORS ASSUME INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY
It is r ea son a ble, fir st , t o a ssu m e t h e ra t ion a lity of a ll of t h e "in dividu a ls" in volved in ou r an a lysis. By th is we m ean simply th a t a n in dividu a l beh a ves pu r posefu lly an d t a kes a ction t en din g t owa r ds th e m a xim a l sat isfa ction of som e goa l. An in dividu a l m a y, of cou r se, va lu e m a n y t h in gs a n d pu r su e m an y goa ls, som e in con flict wit h ea ch oth er . F or ea se of exposition , h owever , we will a ssu m e t h a t in dividu a ls gen era lly valu e fin an cial ga in a n d seek on ly t o m a ximize t h eir ea rn in gs over t h e du r a t ion of t h eir lifet im es. Wh en we sa y th a t in dividu a ls a ct so a s to m a xim ize "ea rn in gs," we m a y ju st a s ea sily sa y (salva con gru itate) t h a t in dividu a ls a ct to m a ximize t h eir "h a ppin ess," "u t ilit y," or st or e of "t iddlywin ks."
In dividu a ls will a t all t im es pr efer m or e in com e t o less in com e. Wh ile t h e fu tu r e is u n cer t a in -in dividu a ls a r e u n able t o for esee ever y even tu a lit y of t h eir pr esen t a ct ion s an d u n able t o ima gin e ever y possible st a t e of t h e world th a t ma y occu r by vir tu e of ch an ce or n a tu r e's ch a n gin g cou r se-in dividu als a re n on eth eless a ble t o for m r ou gh expect a tion s a n d a dju st th ose expecta t ion s in r espon se t o n ew st imu li a n d in for m a t ion . In dividu als will a ct in a r a t ion al m a n n er , in a ccorda n ce wit h th eir pr eferen ce for m ore lifet ime ea r n in gs, su ch th a t a t an y in sta n ce we m a y su ppose th e r eason for wh ich on e cou r se of a ct ion is ch osen r a th er t h a n a n oth er is t h a t t h e in dividu a l expects t o ea r n m or e in t h e ch osen cou r se of a ction th an in t h e a lt ern a t ive. t h e en t it y's u lt im a t e pu r pose (wh et h er it is sh a r eh older va lu e m a xim iza t ion or n ot ) is fu r t h er ed. Th is det er m in a t ion ca n give coh er en ce t o t h e fir m .
3. S ee, e.g., Alex E dm a n s et a l., A M u ltiplicative M od el of Optim al CE O In cen tives in M ark et E qu ilibriu m , 22 REV. F IN. STUD. 481 (2009) (r eflect in g a n a dm ir a ble a n d ch a r a ct er ist ic exa m ple of su ch effor t s).
4. "S: Is t h er e a n yon e wh o wa n t s t o be wr et ch ed a n d u n h a ppy? M: I don 't t h in k so, Socr a t es. S: Th en n o on e wa n t s ba d t h in gs, Men o, if in deed h e does n ot wa n t t o be like t h a t ." P la t o, M en o, in A P LATO READER: E IGH T E SSE NTIAL DIALOGUES 60, 69 (C.D.C. Reeve ed., 2012).
II. OPPORTUNITY COST AND SURPLUS
In dividu a ls have, a t a ll t im es, a set of a lt ern a t ive pot en tial cou rses of a ct ion . F or in st an ce, in dividu a ls wh o a r e cu r ren tly em ployed ma y, u n der lea ve of their cu r ren t em ployer , con tin u e with t h e pr esen t posit ion or su bm it a let t er of r esign a tion t h is very in sta n t a n d en t er th e open la bor ma r ket or st ar t a bu sin ess of t h eir own in st ea d, or t h ey m a y con cu r r en t ly seek open position s an d in t er view wit h ot h er em p loyers wh ile con t in u in g in th eir cu r r en t em ploym en t .
It sh ou ld be st r essed th a t t h e in dividu al is n ever com pelled t o ch oose on e a lt ern a tive over a n ot h er . On e a lwa ys chooses bet ween opt ion s volu n ta r ily. E ven wh er e a con t ra ct specifies pen a lties t o th e in dividu a l pu r su in g or n ot pu rsu in g som e cou r se of a ction , t h e in dividu a l ma y ch oose a t h is or h er discr et ion bet ween th e a lt ern a t ives a n d bea r wh a t con t ra ct u a l cost s a r e a ssocia t ed with eit h er decision .
Th e in dividu a l for mu la t es ordered pr efer en ces for ea ch opt ion in t h e set of a lt er n a tives.
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Assu m e, for exa mple, t h a t on e fa ces a ch oice bet ween option A, opt ion B, a n d opt ion C, wh er e t h e a ssocia ted va lu e of th e expected ea rn in gs t o ea ch is equ a l to A, B, a n d C dolla rs r espect ively. More bein g a lwa ys pr efer a ble t o less, if A > B > C, th en th e in dividu al will pr efer option A t o B, opt ion B to C, a n d opt ion A t o C. Beh a vin g ra t ion ally, t h e in dividu al will ch oose opt ion A over opt ion s B or C wh en pr esen t ed wit h t h e ch oice. Th e secon d-best option , B, is t h e op por t u n it y cost t o ch oosin g A. In oth er wor ds, by ch oosin g option A, t h e in dividu al gives u p B dolla rs in expected fu t u re ea rn in gs t h a t wer e a vaila ble by t h e pu rsu it of opt ion B. Th e r a tion a l in dividu a l will ch oose opt ion A a n d ea r n an a m ou n t A, wh ich ca n be decomposed in t o th e su m of B, opportu n ity cost, a n d th e differen ce bet ween A an d B, wh ich is ca lled su rplu s. In or der t h a t a ch osen a ct ion is con sist en t with ou r con cept ion of r a t ion a lit y, t h e a mou n t of su rplu s mu st be posit ively valu ed, or else equ a l t o zer o in t h e specia l ca se of in differen ce.
Wh er e r a tion a l com mitm en t s of la bor an d ca pit a l t o econ omic ven t u res a r e con cer n ed, t h e expect ed ea r n in gs for a n y in dividu al wh o wor ks or in vests pu rposefu lly in su ch a m a n n er a r e equ a l t o t h e oppor tu n it y cost of t h e com m it m en t plu s som e a ddition a l m ea su r e of su rplu s.
III A SIMPLE E XTE NSION: J OINT RATIONALITY
Ma n y of t h e option s a va ila ble t o a n in dividu al will be cooper a tive ven tu r es t h a t in volve ot h er in dividu a ls. If su ch a n a lt ern a t ive is u lt im a tely pu r su ed, ou r a n a lysis m u st assu m e t h e r a t ion a lit y of a ll pa r t ies t o t h a t join t ven tu r e. Th er efor e, for ea ch in dividu a l pa r t y in volved, t h e va lu e r eceived fr om t h e join t ven tu re 5. Ken n et h J . Ar r ow, Utilities, Attitu d es, Ch oices: A R eview N ote, 26 E CON OME TRICA 1, 1-2 (1958). [Vol. 48 m u st exceed th e opport u n it y cost of wh a t ever is given u p in con sider a tion for t h e a greem en t . Th e in dividu al pa you t fr om a join t ven t u re, or en t er prise, is a ga in equ al t o t h e su m of su rplu s a n d oppor tu n it y cost for ea ch pa r t y. Th e t ota l va lu e of t h e join t ven t u r e, exclu din g exter n a lities, is t h erefor e equ a l t o th e su m of oppor tu n it y cost s over a ll pa r t icipan t s an d a n addition a l posit ive a m ou n t of en terprise su rplu s, wh ich ca n provide t h e r equ isit e in dividu al su rplu s t o ea ch m ember. Th e valu e of th e wh ole is, in t h is sen se, a lwa ys gr ea t er t h a n its con stit u en t p a r t s. 6 F or exa m ple, con sider an en t repren eu r 's choice t o en t er in t o a con t r a ct with a bookkeeper or , con versely, t h e bookkeeper 's ch oice to en t er in to a con t ra ct wit h th e en t r epr en eu r .
By h ir in g t h e bookkeeper , t h e en tr epren eu r ca n spen d m ore of h is or h er t ime on sa les a n d pr odu ct developm en t a n d ea r n an addition a l $1,000 per a n n u m . On t h e ot h er h a n d, t h e bookkeeper h a s in t er viewed for m a n y position s a n d r eceived an offer of $500 per a n n u m , an d does n ot expect t o r eceive a n y gr ea ter offers. If n o ot h er su it able in dividu a ls a pply for t h e bookkeepin g position , it is clea r th a t a m u t u a lly r a tion a l con t ra ct is feasible a n d th e two in dividu a ls will for m a join t ven tu r e. Th e en t r epr en eu r will pa y t h e bookkeeper h is or h er oppor tu n it y cost , $500, plu s a n am ou n t of t h e bookkeeper 's su rplu s.
Th e en t r epr en eu r will ea rn h is or h er ou t side oppor tu n it y-in th is ca se, t h e valu e of n ot h irin g a bookkeeper (or , a lt ern a t ively, t h e va lu e of h ir in g a differ en t bookkeeper )-plu s som e a m ou n t of th e en t r epren eu r 's su rplu s. In th is ca se, t h e en t erpr ise surplu s is $500 ($1,000-$500) a n d will, in du e cou rse, be divided bet ween t h e en t repr en eu r a n d th e bookkeeper .
All con t r a ct s requ ir e, as a condit ion t o t h eir exist en ce, some m odicu m of en t er prise su r plu s t o su ppor t th e mu t u al ra t ion alit y of t h e pa r t ies t o t h e con t ra ct .
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Th e pa r ticula r valu e, of cou rse, can r a n ge fr om n ea r ly zero t o a n in fin ite a m ou n t a t t h e pola r limit sa n d will, in pra ct ice, fa ll a t som e in t er media t e poin t .
IV. THE F IRM AS A NEXUS-OF-CONTRACTS
Wh en t wo in dividu a ls bin d t h emselves t o ea ch ot h er t h rou gh con t r a ct (implicit ly or explicit ly), th ey form a simple firm or or ga n iza t ion . Wh en a m u ltit u de of con t ra ct s ar e for m ed bet ween 6. S ee Ar m en A. Alch ia n & Su sa n Woodwa r d, T h e Firm is Dead ; L on g L ive T h e Firm : A R eview of Oliver E . William son 's Th e E con om ic In st it u t ion s of Ca pit a lism , 26 J. E CON. LITERATURE 65, 70 (1988) ("Th e cla ssic, pa r a digm a t ic pr iva t e pr oper t y fir m is a coa lit ion a m on g own er s of sepa r a t ely own ed r esou r ces wh ose va lu e a s a t ea m exceeds t h e su m of t h e m a r ket va lu es ea ch cou ld get sepa r a t ely.").
7. Su r plu s n eed n ot be der ived fr om t h e va lu e of fina l consu m pt ion . It m a y in st ea d r ela t e on ly t o t h e pr efer en ces of t h e pr odu cer s. Mu t u a l ga in m a y be h a d t h r ou gh t r a de a m on gst t h em a lon e. If a job r equ ir es t wo t a sks, wh ich ea ch pr efer s in opposit e, t h e pa r t ies m a y ga in t h r ou gh division of la bor , bet ween t h em selves. la r ger n u mbers of pa r t icipan t s, a m ore complex or ga n iza t ion is for m ed. Som et im es, t h e in dividu als in volved will pe t ition th eir sover eign 8 t o for m a con t r a ct pr ovidin g for t h e embodim en t of a legal fict ion t h a t is t o be en dowed with cer t ain qu a lit ies, r igh t s, pr ivileges, a n d obliga t ion s befor e th e la w a n d societ y. In su ch a ca se, th e or ga n iza t ion of in dividu als m a y becom e a corpor a tion , a pa r tn ersh ip, a sole pr opr iet orsh ip, or a n y oth er lega lly sa n ction ed body. In m a n y in sta n ces, th is lega l body ma y t h en en ter in to con t r a ct s wit h oth er eith er corpor ea l or lega l bodies a n d t h u s form t h e st r u ct u ra l cor e of t h e n exu s-of-con tracts t h a t com prises t h e firm or or ga n iza t ion . No m a t t er t h e degr ee of com plexit y, h owever , t h e or igin al a ssu mpt ion of m u tu a l ra t ion a lit y of a ll of t h e pa r t ies in volved still h olds. E a ch in dividu a l ch ooses h is or h er associa tion with ea ch ot h er a n d wit h th e lega l body, in t h e sa m e ma n n er la id ou t befor e, volu n t a rily. In dividu a ls do so beca u se t h e choice of m ixin g t h eir ca pit a l or la bor wit h th is en t erprise offers t h em some in dividu al su rplu s in excess of t h eir oppor t u n it y cost .
Wh a t is n ecessa r y for ou r en t r epr en eu r -bookkeeper fir m is also n ecessa r y for t h e la r gest mu lt in a tion a l con glom er a t e; a n y fir m 's exist en ce depen ds u pon t h e exist en ce of en t erprise su rplu s th a t can t h en pr ovide in dividu al su r plu s t o each mem ber an d, in th a t m a n n er , bin d t h e fir m t oget h er th r ou gh on ly t h e in depen den t , r a t ion a l a ct ion of it s pa r ticipan t s.
In vest or s will on ly bu y a sh a r e of stock if th ey expect mor e r et u rn fr om th e dolla r in vest ed with t h e compan y t h a n fr om a dolla r t h a t cou ld be in vested elsewh er e. A ban k will provide a loa n if th e a ssu r a n ces it r eceives an d t h e likelih ood of a r et u r n con vin ces th e ba n k t h a t t h e loa n is m or e pr ofit a ble th a n an ot h er th a t could be m a de. Assem bly-lin e wor ker s will sh ow u p t o wor k on Mon da y if t h ey expect to ea r n more doin g so th an cou ld be ea r n ed elsewh er e. Cu st omer s will bu y a produ ct if t h ey expect m ore sa tisfact ion fr om t h e compa n y's produ ct th a n from an ot h er . Th e execu tive will sign a n em ploymen t con tr a ct if h e or sh e believes t h at doin g so is bet t er t h a n seekin g employm en t elsewh ere. Boa rd mem ber s will a ccept t h eir du t ies if th e compen sa t ion , t h e r et u r n on a ct ive over sigh t of t h e in vest m en t , a n d th e h on or an d dist in ct ion r esu lt in g fr om t h e posit ion pr ove t o be th e best u se of t h eir t im e a n d t a len t s.
If t h e en t erpr ise su r plu s does n ot fir st exist , t h er e is n o valu e to offer a ll of t h e va r iou s ot h er en t erpr ise-con stit u en t s an d t h er efore t h er e ca n be n o en t er prise t o spea k of. Bu t , if t h e en t erpr ise su rplu s does exist , we will see t h a t t h e firm sh ou ld also exist , a lm ost by n ecessit y. 
V. NICHE AS TH E SOURCE OF SURPLUS
Con ven tion a l econ om ic an a lysis t ells u s th a t t h is su rplu s sh ou ld n ot exist for lon g. In perfect com pet it ion , ea rn in gs over oppor t u n ity cost a r e discovered by oth er s an d driven t o zer o by a n a ct ive pricin g m ech a n ism .
Her e, ou r fir m sh ou ld h a r dly seem a cohesive or ga n iza t ion ; a t h in film of su r plu s -in t h eor y, in fin it ely sm all-is a ll t h a t wou ld su ppor t a t ra n sa ction . E xogen ou s, u n an t icipa ted ch a n ges t o prices wou ld for ce r en egot ia t ion s or dissolve t h e t r a n sa ct ion a s a lt er n at ive oppor tu n it ies becom e m ore or less a t t r a ct ive. Th e corpor a t ion a s we kn ow it wou ld n ot exist if m a r kets wer e t o fu n ction per fect ly a n d complet ely in t h is idea lized zer o-r en t wor ld.
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All produ ct ion wou ld, t o t h e con t r ar y, occu r in on e-off, t r a n sien t open m a r ket t r a n sa ct ion s a m on g in depen den t , disloyal pa r ties. Ou r "firm s" wou ld exist on ly for th e passin g du r a tion of a pa r ticu la r t r a n sa ct ion .
In t h is per fectly r espon sive m a r ket m odel, even on e competin g in t erest to a t r a n sa ct ion will r esu lt in a biddin g con t est t h a t will con sequ en tly elimin a t e r en t s or su rplu s. Th e fir m or corpora t ion t h en mu st exist in t h e sph er es of econ om ic coordin a t ion wh er e t h e m a r ket , or t h e set of a lt er n a tives, is n ot . (In a sen se, t h is bein g wh er e t h e oppor tu n it y set is discon t in u ou s.) Th e m a r ket bein g on ly t h e m embers of t h e set of a lt ern a t ive u ses of r esou r ces for fin al con su mpt ion , t h e firm m u st , t h er efor e, exist by vir t u e of its u n iqu en ess or dist in ct ion , in som e sh ape or form .
11 If t h e fir m was n ot ca pa ble of som et h in g t h a t it alon e cou ld a ccom plish , price a dju st men ts wou ld elimin a te t h e su r plu s. Th e u lt im a t e sou r ce of su rplu s is n ich e. (Tot a l su r plu s is derived fr om n ich e a n d sca le.
12 ) On e m u st t h in k of t h e econ om y a n d t h e en t r epr en eu r in th e followin g ma n n er . Va r iou s r esou r ces exist in time a n d pla ce. Th ey exist a s a n Ar ca dia n , disordered set wit h ou t pr eju dice t o h u ma n pr eferen ce in th eir or igin al m an ifest a tion s a n d loca tion s. In t er mixed wit h th e m a ter ial r esou r ces a r e in dividu a ls, wh o seek to or der t h e wor ld a r ou n d th eir pr eferen ces-it t h u sly pr ogresses fr om Ar ca dia t o a n econ omic Ut opia . Th ese in dividu a ls, in addition t o con t r ibu tin g th eir la bor a n d t a len ts posit ively t o t h e set , con su me fr om it ; t h ey con su m e in a ccordan ce wit h th eir wa n t s a n d ma t erial desir es. All econ omic act ivit y issu es for th fr om t h ese con su mpt ive wa n t s a n d desir es. We wou ld n ot dig coa l ou t of t h e ear t h if n obody 10. R.H . Coa se, T h e N atu re of th e Firm , 4 E CONOMICA 386, 386 (1937). 11. MICHAEL E. P ORTE R, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUPERIOR P E RF ORMANCE 11, 17 (1985) .
12. Th e pr ior a n a lysis a n d som e of t h e followin g com m en t a r y wer e or igin a lly su ggest ed t o u s by sever a l r em a r ks m a de by Rich a r d D. Pa r son s du r in g a lect u r e h e ga ve t o gr a du a t e st u den t s a t t h e Wh a r t on Sch ool of t h e Un iver sit y of P en n sylva n ia . S ee Rich a r d D. P a r son s, Lect u r e a t t h e Wh a r t on Sch ool of t h e Un iver sit y of P en n sylva n ia : Decision Ma kin g in t h e Lea der sh ip Ch a ir (F eb. 20, 2013) . H is in sigh t s on sca le a n d nich e in t h e con t ext of or ga n iza t ion a l st r a t egy wer e pa r t icu la r ly u sefu l. S ee id . wa n t ed it ; we wou ld n ot gr ow cr ops if th ey wer e n ot desir ed by in dividu a ls in n eed of food; sch ola rs wou ld n ot pr odu ce writ in gs a n d t ea ch in gs if t h ese wer e n ot , som eh ow, desir able a ct ivit ies to eit h er t h em selves or t o oth ers. In th e en d, an act ivit y th a t was n ot aim ed a t t h e sa t isfa ction of som e desir e wou ld belon g som ewh er e ot h er t h a n t h e sph er e of econ om ic act ivit y. Th e en t r epr en eu r exists both wit h in a n d ou t side t h is en vir on m en t .
Th er e is a n old t a le a bou t a n econ omist wh o does n ot pick u p a $100 bill beca u se, in efficien t econ om ies, $100 bills do n ot lay h a ph a za rdly on t h e grou n d.
13 Th e efficien t econ om y is an idealized wor ld, wh er e ever y resou r ce is pu t t o its m ost va lu a ble u se in r ela tion t o con su m er desir es. H ere, an y act ion or cha n ge of cou rse wou ld be fu t ile a n d cou ld on ly lead t o a less efficien t wor ld beca u se it n ecessa r ily in volves m ovin g an object fr om t h e pen u ltim a t e sta te of it s gr ea test u sefu ln ess. Th is is n ot , of cour se, th e world we live in . As m en tion ed, in rela tion t o h u ma n n eeds, we in h er it a cha ot ic, disordered, u n pr eju diced set of assets. Mor eover , m a n y of t h os e u sefu l objects exist in pla ces a s yet u n discover ed by u s a n d ma y be pu t t o u se in com bin a t ion s t h a t a r e a lso as yet u n kn own . 14 F a cin g th is en viron men t , t h e en t repr en eu r 's con cern is pr im a r ily t h a t of in qu ir y.
H e or sh e is t o r econn oit er t h is en viron men t , u sin g in feren ce a n d a ccept in g u n cer t a in expect a tion s, t o fin d wh ere t h e con stit u en t r esou rce dist ribu t ion ma y be bet t er a r r a n ged so a s t o m a p m or e efficien t ly on to fin al consu mpt ive desir es. Upon fin din g a n u n sa t isfa ct or y situ a t ion , t h e en t r epr en eu r m a kes it mor e sa tisfa ct or y, a ffect in g a t r an sfor m a t ion t h rou gh m u t u a l a dju st m en t of ea ch a sset in volved. E a ch asset t h en , bot h ph ysica l a n d h u ma n , is m oved or fr eed t o m or e pr odu ct ive u ses. Th e differen ce bet ween t h e su m tot a l of con su mpt ive va lu e befor e t h e en t r epr en eu r 's a ction a n d th e su m t ota l a ft er is wh er e ou r en t erpr ise su r plu s is der ived. By a con st an t pr ocess of discovery a cr oss spa ce a n d tim e, of fr esh an d u n exploit ed n ich e, an d t h rou gh t h is t r a n sfor ma t ion , we m ove pr ogr essively fr om ou r disorder ed wor ld t owa rds a n idea l, m a xim ally efficien t wor ld, t h a t wh ich t h e econ om ist s im a gin e. Th is is a process th a t is u n likely t o be com plet ed a n y t im e soon . In t h e m ea n tim e, t h er e is ign or an ce, disorder , a n d en trepren eu rs, wh ich collectively give rise t o su r plu s a n d fir m s.
VI. ON SCALE AS TH E MULTIPLIER OF NICHE
Th e en t r epr en eu r first mu st iden tify th is m ar ket n ich e. A n iche ca n t a ke m a n y for ms. Som e en tr epr en eu rial discover ies will be local 14. S ee gen erally F r iedr ich A. H a yek, T h e U se of Kn ow led ge in S ociety, 35 AM. E CON. REV. 519 (1945) (discu ssin g t h e cen t r a lit y of kn owledge t o econ om ic a ct ivit y).
in n a t u re-for exa mple, t h a t a n u m ber of people m u st go ou t of t h eir wa y for coffee in th e mor n in g a n d a n ew sh op could bet t er ser ve t h em . Som e en t r epr en eu r ial in n ova t ion m a y be global in n a tu r efor in st a n ce, th e discover y t h a t people ever ywh er e wou ld be bet t er ser ved by th e a bilit y to m a ke th eir own coffee a t h om e. E ach t ype of in n ova tion dr a ws r esou rces a wa y fr om t h eir origin a l u ses.
Wh en en t r epr en eu r ia l idea s a re poten t ia lly br oad in t h eir a pplica bilit y, a bu sin ess will expa n d, dr a win g r esou rces a wa y fr om wh ich ever loca l econ om y t h e bu sin ess com es t o in h abit . Wh a t ever discovery pr ovided t h e ger m of it s exist en ce is applied elsewh er e. A n ich e is given sca le. As t h e compan y expa n ds, wit h ea ch sta ge en a bled by expecta t ion s of in dividu al su rplu s, th e t ota l a m ou n t of en t erpr ise su rplu s gr ows wit h it .
Ar ou n d th e in itia l n iche, t h e fir m develops a cor e compet en cy a n d st r ea m lin es it s pr ocesses fu r th er . Th is core is t h e in for m a tion a n d syst ems-specific t o t h e compan y it self-wh ich a llow it to bet t er ser ve, a n d con tin u e to impr ove u pon it s a bilit y t o ser ve, it s pa r ticu la r n ich e th a n oth er s wit h ou t it cou ld do. E a ch in n ova tion t h er ewith cr ea t es va lu e by m ovin g an d fr eein g r esou rces in tim e an d pla ce t o m or e pr odu ct ive u ses.
An expa n sion cou ld be a ffect ed in m an y wa ys. F or in sta n ce, on e cou ld im a gin e a fir m wh ose cor e compet en cy wa s n est ed wit h th e en t r epr en eu r a n d perh aps sever al oth er m an a ger s. In t h is ca se, su rplu s wou ld be derived fr om t h eir pa r ticula r kn owledge a n d exper tise. Su r plu s is given sca le by t h e man a gers ' a bilit y t o delega t e t a sks to a r ela tively la r ger n u m b er of su bordin a tes. Th is effect ively a llows in cr ea sin g specializa t ion by t h e en t r epr en eu r , wh o is fr ee t o devot e con sider a bly m or e of h is or h er t im e t o t h e n iche a ct ivities. Th e m a n n er in wh ich t h e compa n y specializes ma y a ffect t h e u ltim a te dist ribu t ion . On e could expect som e compa n ies, for in sta n ce, t o h a ve dist in ct sector s of em ploym en t . In t h e pr ima r y sect or , specia lized employees ma y develop t h e m et h ods of exploitin g t h e fir m 's pa r t icu la r n ich e. Secondar ily, ma n y n ecessa r y t asks ma y be r ou tin ized a n d delega t ed t o less essen tia l per son n el. Th e secon da r y employees m a y be m ore in t er ch an gea ble with oth er m a r ket a lter n a t ive wor ker s a n d t h erefor e blen d towa r ds t h e m a rket in t h e fir m -m a rket du a lit y.
Th e sou r ces of su rplu s m a y be dist r ibu t ed m or e t owa r ds t h e prim a r y, specia lized employees t h a n to t h e secon da r y a n d t h u s bin d t h em m or e closely wit h t h e firm (m ea n in g th ere is a gr eat er bu ffer of su rplu s t o pr even t sepa ra t ion s t h a t occu r wh en t h eir oppor tu n it y cost ch an ges so a s t o t h en exceed t h e va lu e of con tin u in g t h e r ela t ion sh ip).
VII. THE P ROBLE M OF AGENCY, OR AGENCY COSTS?
Th e pr oblem of a gen cy is m er ely em bedded wit h in t h is over lyin g con t r a ct u a l st ru ctu r e. Con t r a cts, in volvin g mor e t h an on e pa r t y, ea ch wit h in depen den t pu r poses, will in volve conflict in g in t er est s eo ipso. Wh ere on e ma y pr efer r est an d com for t , th e ot h er su r ely m igh t pr efer t h a t per son 's fu lsom e effor ts; wh er e on e m a y pr efer sa fe a n d t idy in vest men ts, t h e oth er ma y desir e ext r a va ga n t ly r isky pr oject s a n d ca pit a l a lloca tion s; wh er e on e m a y prefer t o t r a vel expen sively wh ile on bu sin Bu t , in t h is a n a lysis, a gen cy cost s a r e ju st t h a t -cost s; n o differ en t th an m a t er ials costs, t r a n spor t a t ion costs, or produ ct ion costs. On e does n ot sa y "t h e pr oblem of m a t eria ls cost s," likewise t h e "pr oblem of a gen cy," is r ea lly ju st a n a gen cy cost . A secon d -order an a lysis of a ll t h e cost s, in clu din g t h ose of a gen cy a n d t h en of expect ed reven u es, is n eeded t o deter m in e t h e fea sibilit y of a con t ra ct an d t h er eby u n der sta n d th e fou n da tion a n d essen ce of t h e fir m . Agen cy problems ar e on ly a su bspecies of a m ore gen er a l econ omic qu estion .
VIII. THE DENOMINATIONS OF AGENCY ACTIONS
An a ct ion ta ken ca n (1) in cr ease th e t ot a l va lu e of t h e firm a s a wh ole (i.e., pr odu ce en ter prise su r plu s, wh er e a ll cost s h a ve been con sider ed) or (2) redu ce or lea ve u n cha n ged th e t ot a l va lu e. In th e fir st ca se, it is clea r t h a t t h e a ction will be t aken a n d a ll pa r ties st a n d to ben efit fr om t h e expan sion in va lu e. By vir tu e of t h e expa n sion , ea ch pa r t y cou ld be given a su it able in du cem en t t o cooper a t e. By con t ra st , in t h e n ext in st an ce of con t ra ct ion or n o ch a n ge in su rplu s, a n a ct ion is t a ken a t t h e expen se of an oth er pa r t y.
It is clea r , given ou r ea rlier discu ssion , t h a t act ion s of th e first sor t a r e n ecessa r y fir st t o a fir m 's exist en ce a n d la t er t o its 15 . S ee Ar m en A. Alch ia n & H a r old Dem set z, Prod u ction , In form ation Costs, an d E con om ic Organ ization , 62 AM. E CON. REV. 777, 780 (1972) ("If t h er e is a n et in cr ea se in pr odu ct ivit y a va ila ble by t ea m pr odu ct ion , n et of t h e m et er in g cost a ssocia t ed wit h disciplinin g t h e t ea m , t h en t ea m pr odu ct ion will be r elied u pon r a t h er t h a n a m u lt it u de of bila t er a l exch a n ge of sepa r a ble in dividu a l ou t pu t s."). expa n sion .
E a ch decision th en in va r ia bly r esu lt s in some dist r ibu tion of t h e r esu lt in g su rplu s goin g t o eith er of th e pa r ties. Over t im e, th ese division s ca n ossify in t o a m or e or less ch a ra ct er ist ic fir m -level dist r ibu tion of en t erpr ise su rplu s.
Act
m in ology der ived fr om political models is m ost in form a t ive; a dva n t a ges a re ga in ed t h r ou gh "bar ga in in g, n egot ia t ion , a n d coa lit ion s."
16 Ala s, we h a ve a r rived a t a gen er al defin ition of th e pr oblem of a gen cy. Th e problem of a gen cy is con cer n ed with t h e r edistr ibu t ive a ct ion s. F rom t h e perspective of an y pa r t icu lar pa r t y, an a gen cy cost is in cu r r ed wh en a n oth er pa r t y gain s a t t h e fir st pa r t y's expen se. Wit h a view t o t h e en t ire cor por a t ion , a gen cy costs a r e in cu r r ed wh en cost ly a ct ion s ar e ta ken , eith er ex an t e or ex post, wh ich a r e in t en ded t o effect t h e dist ribu t ion .
So, is a gen cy t h eor y st ill via ble? We h ope t o h a ve est a blish ed by a r gu in g from self-eviden t a xioms t h a t it is n ot on ly via ble, bu t n ecessa r y. Or ga n iza t ion in a fir m r equ ir es som e dist r ibu tion of en t erpr ise su rplu s, a pr ocess wh ich will br in g a gen t s an d prin cipa ls in t o con flict . All a ction s will t h en in volve a dist ribu tive compon en t . Dist r ibu tion implies a gen cy con cer n s.
Agen cy th eor y er rs in it s specifica t ion of "r eser va t ion wa ges" t h a t a r e set by m a r ket s. Su ch t er min ology im bu es a false sen se of object ivit y t o t h e dist ribu t ion a l issu e. In ligh t of ou r discu ssion of su rplu s, t h is view ca n n ot be su sta in ed.
IX. MUTUAL DEPENDENCY: P RINCIP LE -AGENT OR AGENT-AGENT?
Ou r defin ition does n ot r equ ir e a sh ar p distin ct ion bet ween a gen ts a n d pr in cipa ls. Wh ile th e prin cipa l-a gen t r ela tion sh ip is gen era lly t h ou gh t of a s t h e a r ch et ypical ca se of a t a skm a st er
Ka t h leen M. E isen h a r dt , Agen cy T h eory: An Assessm en t an d R eview , 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 57, 63 (1989).
pr in cipa l dict a tin g h is dem a n ds t o t h e ser vile a gen t , t h e distin ction is u su a lly n ot so clea r . Both pr in cipal an d a gen t m u st en joy some m ea su r e of su rplu s by vir t u e of t h eir mu t u al cooper a t ion an d a r e t h er efore in som e sen se bou n d t o ea ch ot h er . A fa ilu r e t o m ain ta in t h e r ela t ion sh ip is ba d for bot h pa r ties ; th er efor e, t h e au t h ority wit h in ma y n ot be u n a m bigu ou sly a ppor t ion ed.
A "m u tu al depen den cy" is in ma n y ca ses closer t o a n a ccu r at e cha r a ct er iza tion of t h e sit u a t ion t h a n is pr in cipa l-a gen t .
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Th is, h owever , wou ld a ppea r t o lea ve a n in tr a ct a ble sit u a tion t h a t is on ly r econ ciled t en u ou sly th r ou gh delica t e n egot ia t ion s, societal n or ms, an d oth er for ces of person a lit y. Th er e is a t h ea r t a cea seless t en sion an d st r u ggle bet ween con flictin g in t er est s.
F or exa mple, a lt h ou gh t h e r ela tion sh ip bet ween a boa rd an d m a n a gem en t is often seen sta r kly t h rou gh th e pr in cipa l-a gen t fr a m ewor k, on e cou ld ben efit con cept u a lly by soften in g t h is view. It is t ru e th a t a boa rd possesses th e a u th or it y t o fire m an a gemen t , bu t it is likewise t r u e t h a t ma n a gem en t h as t h e au t h or it y t o qu it if t h ey so desire.
18 F or a boa rd, losin g a m a n a gem en t t eam will m ost likely r esu lt in tr em en dou s disr u ption , loss of crit ica l ma n a gem en t -specific in stit u tion a l kn owledge, a n d, u ltim a t ely, lower per for m an ce. Th ere is a sign ifica n t a m ou n t of "su rplu s" t h a t t h e com pan y r eceives fr om it s rela tion sh ip with a pa r ticula r m an a gemen t t ea m ra t h er th an wit h a n ot h er . Th e con ver se is a lso t r u e; m a n a gem en t h a s u su a lly in vest ed a sign ifica n t a mou n t of th eir ca reer s, tr ain in g, an d skill set in th e en ter pr ise, a n d m a y be u n likely t o fin d simila r employm en t elsewh ere. Th ey likewise r eceive su r plu s from con tin u in g t h e r ela tion sh ip with t h e boa r d. Bot h m a n a gem en t a n d t h e boa rd th u s h a ve wide la t itu de in th eir pot en tia l dea lin gs wit h ea ch oth er , an d t h e lin es of a u th orit y can n ot be dr a wn in a con cr et e fa sh ion . 19 Bu t,
S ee, e.g., Oliver E . Willia m son , T ran saction -Cost E con om ics: T h e Govern an ce of Con tractu al R elation s, 22 J .L. & E CON. 233, 240 (1979) ("In a s m u ch a s t h e va lu e of t h is ca pit a l in ot h
er u ses is, by defin it ion , m u ch sm a ller t h a n t h e specia lized u se for wh ich it h a s been in t en ded, t h e su pplier is effect ively "locked in t o" t h e t r a n sa ct ion t o a sign ifica n t degr ee. Th is is sym m et r ica l, m or eover , in t ha t t h e bu yer ca n n ot t u r n t o a lt er n a t ive sou r ces of su pply a n d obt a in t h e it em on fa vor a ble t er m s").
18. Th e P r oph et Sir a ch 's wisdom con cer n in g h ou seh old m a n a gem en t is in st r u ct ive for a gen cy t h eor ist s. Alt h ou gh a sla ve m u st n ot be t r ea t ed t oo kin dly-"[f]odder , a wa n d, a n d bu r den s, a r e for t h e a ss; a n d br ea d, cor r ect ion , a n d wor k, for a ser va n t . . . . Set h im t o wor k, a s is fit for h im : if h e be n ot obedien t , pu t on m or e h ea vy fet t er s "-on e h a s pa id for h im a n d m u st lim it on e's sever it y, for if t h e sla ve sh ou ld r u n a wa y, "wh ich wa y wh ilt t h ou go t o seek h im ?" S irach 33:24, 28, 31 (New Oxfor d An n ot a t ed Bible: New Revised St a n da r d Ver sion , wit h t h e Apocr yph a ).
19. S ee Alch ia n & Dem set z, su pra n ot e 15, a t 777 ("It is com m on t o see t h e fir m ch a r a ct er ized by t h e power t o set t le issu es by fia t , by a u t h or it y, or by disciplin a r y a ct ion su per ior t o t h a t a va ila ble in t h e con ven t ion a l m a r ket . Th is is delu sion . Th e fir m does n ot own a ll it s in pu t s. It ha s n o power of fia t , n o a u t h or it y, n o disciplin a r y a ct ion a n y differ en t in t h e sligh t est degr ee fr om or din a r y m a r ket con t r a ct in g bet ween a n y t wo people. I ca n "pu n ish " you on ly by wit h h oldin g fu t u r e bu sin ess or by seekin g r edr ess in t h e cou r t s for a n y t h er e is a lwa ys th e pot en t ial t h a t on e side ma y pr eem pt t h e ot h er , ga in con t r ol, a n d t a ke h old of a gr ea t er por t ion , or n ear ly t h e en tire a m ou n t , of t h e su rplu s. (An d, for t h e oth er pa r ties, t h e opposit e will be r eceived.) F r om t h is possibilit y, ea ch , even a t r est , m u st possess a gu a rdin g t en sion a n d wa t ch fu ln ess.
Th is a n a lysis su ggest s a decen t ra lized allocat ion of power t h r ou gh ou t t h e or ga n iza t ion .
Wh a t is t r u e of m a n a gem en t r ega rdin g t h eir fir m -specific ear n in gs a n d in vestm en t s ma y be sa id in va r yin g degr ees a bou t all of th e ot h er employees. As su ch, m u t u a l depen den cies an d n egotia t ion ar e essen t ial or im por t an t com pon en t s t o a ll of th e en t er prise's r ela t ion sh ips. Bu t , oft en th is exigen t dyn a mic is su ppr essed by t h e cen t r alized power given to m a n a ger s wh o t h en decide, on t h e basis of gen era l policies, t h e pa r ticu la r ou t com es of t h ese n egotia t ion s. In ot h er wor ds, t h e fir m 's gen era l policy ma y be t o pa y a n in dividu a l a cer t ain a mou n t of com pen sa t ion for per form in g a cer t a in job. So a s t o m ain t ain th e in t egrit y of t h is gen er al policy, an d so as n ot t o set an a dver se pr eceden t , in dividu a ls a r e som etim es given lim it ed a bilit y t o con t r a dict it by ba r ga in in g for a n a lt ern a tive a mou n t . In effect , a n em ployee is offer ed a t a ke-it-or -lea ve-it pr oposition . If t h e "it" offers su rplu s, t h e em ployee will t a ke "it ."
X. THE DESIRABILITY AND P OTE NTIALITY OF E NDING TH IS WARFARE OF INTERESTS Th e fir m , a s we h a ve descr ibed it , is in a con st an t sta t e of con flict . It is comprised of a mu ltiplicit y of in t er est s, en ga ged in a wa r of a ll a ga in st a ll. Th e will a n d in t er est s of on e t o t h e ot h er a re locked in opposit ion . It is on ly u n der st r ain th a t a su ccessfu l project ca n be complet ed a n d each can gain . Th er e is, to ever y t ra n sa ction t h a t ext en ds over tim e, a const an t t h r ea t of expr opria t ion -of on e pa r t y ga in in g a t t h e expen se of h is or h er coun t erpa r t y.
Th is ca n pr esen t a gr ea t difficult y for t h e firm becau se th e fir m 's en t ire existen ce is pr edica ted u pon its distin ctn ess fr om m a r ket a lt ern a tives.
Th a t wh ich su ppor ts a t r an sact ion by pr odu cin g t h e su rplu s mu st be u n iqu e. Th e developm en t of u n iqu e a sset s r equ ir es specific in vest m en t s by pa r ticipa n ts. Specific in vest m en t s becom e su n k cost s wh ose va lu es a re depen den t u pon t h e rela tion sh ip for wh ich t h ey ar e m ade. Th e difficu lt y t h a t a rises is t h en t h a t of in du cin g pa r t icipan t s t o m a ke su ch in vest m en ts u n der t h e t h r ea t of la t er expr opria tion by th e ot h er pa r t ies.
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Con sider t h e ba r ga in in g a n d n egot ia tion of su rplu s as t h ou gh it wer e a ga m e of ch ess. If t h e pla y wer e fr ee, it wou ld n ot be difficult fa ilu r e t o h on or ou r exch a n ge a gr eem en t . Th a t is exa ct ly a ll t h a t a n y em ployer ca n do.").
20. S ee gen erally Willia m son su pra n ot e 17, a t 234, 238, 241-42, 250-54 (discu ssin g t r a n sa ct ion -specific in vest m en t s, oppor t u n ism , t h e im possibilit y of com plet e con t r a ct in g, a n d t h e r espon ses t o ga ps in con t r a ct in g, wh ich pr ovide cr it ica l in sigh t s for ou r r ea son in g h er ein ).
t o fin d t wo willin g pa r t ies for a m a t ch . Su ppose, h owever , t h er e wa s a r equ irem en t t h a t befor e ea ch m ove, a pla yer m u st pa y $5 in to a pot th a t will be given t o t h e win n er . On e m a y decide t o pla y a t t h e ou t set if t h e oppon en t s wer e equ a lly m a t ched. Bu t , it becom es less likely t h a t on e will give over t h e fee for con t in u in g pla y if t h e oth er oppon en t wer e a mu ch st r on ger pla yer or if, in la t er sta ges of th e ga m e, t h e oppon en t h a d gain ed a clea r advan t a ge in st ra t egy or poin t s. Th e likelih ood t h a t a ll t h e ga in s wou ld go t o t h e ot h er , st r on ger pla yer r esu lt s in depr ivin g t h e m a t ch of wh a t m a y be ot h er wise desir a ble pla y.
Th er efor e, wh er e u n bridled self-in t er est r eign s su pr em e, t h e a bilit y a n d in cen t ive t o in itia t e costly, bu t n on et h eless pot en tially pr ofita ble ven tu r es a re dimin ish ed. Th e gu a rded a n d su spiciou s a t m osph er e of a H obbesia n bu sin ess en tit y ca n t h er efore be cou n terpr odu ctive a n d u n desir a ble:
In su ch a con dit ion t h er e is n o pla ce for in du st r y, beca u se t h e fr u it t h er eof is u n cer t a in , a n d con sequ en t ly, n ot cu lt u r e of t h e ea r t h , n o n a viga t ion n or u se of com m odit ies t h a t m a y be im por t ed by sea , n o com m odiou s bu ildin g, n o in st r u m en t s of m ovin g a n d r em ovin g su ch t h in gs a s r equ ir e m u ch for ce, n o kn owledge of t h e fa ce of t h e ea r t h ; n o a ccou n t of t im e, n o a r t s, n o let t er s, n o societ y . . . . Th is st a t e of in t ern a l com petit ion a n d st r ife is u n desira ble. On e wou ld expect t h a t pa r t ies t a ke m ea su r es t o a void su ch a situ a tion or t h a t compa n ies t h a t did n ot do so wou ld be disfa vored by t h e com pet it ive evolu tion of t h e m ar ketplace. Th is la st is an im por t an t poin t . Th e compa n y m u st for tify it self a gain st n ot ju st discord wit h in , bu t a lso discord wit h ou t . In a competit ive econom y, its effor t s t o su sta in it s valu e ar e oft en t h wa r ted by t h e st ren gth of ot h er r iva l com mu n it ies (compa n ies). In t ern a l discord wou ld t h en beget ext ern a l wea kn ess.
Th e pa r t ies to a n en t erpr ise m a y a t t empt t o pu t a n en d to t h e perpetu a l con flict of th eir opposed an d wa r r in g in t er ests. To do th is, t h ey m a y specify t h rou gh con t ra ct t h e pa yoffs an d dist r ibu tion to va r iou s sta t e-con t in gen t r ela t ion al ou t com es ex a n t e. In t h is, a lt h ou gh ea ch pa r t y's power t o a chieve ben eficia l t er m s is expr essed in th e n egot ia t ed con t r act , pa r t ies give u p, for th e du ra t ion of th e con t r a ct , t h e a bilit y la t er t o express th eir pa r ticula r in t erest s, s o fa r a s t h e t er ms of t h e a gr eem en t specify t h e ou t com e a n d r est rict fr ee a ct ion . Before t h e con tr a ct wa s for med, pa r ticu la r ou t com es a n d pa yoffs depen ded u pon t h e fr ee pla y of opposin g in t er est s. Aft er wa rd, t h e willed self-in t er est of t h e opposin g pa r ties is su ppla n t ed, in sofa r a s explicitly expr essed, by t h e t er m s t o t h e a gr eem en t .
Th erefor e, it can be seen th a t , t h r ou gh mu t u al coven a n t , th e a gen t 's power is t r an sfer r ed t o t h e con t ra ct a n d given t h en t o wh ich ever a u th or it y en for ces con t r act u a l t er ms. In a n egot ia t ed ou t com e, power r efer s t o a n a gen t 's abilit y t o exer t a n d sa t isfy h is or h er will. Th e will bein g dir ect ed t owa r ds self-in t er est , a n a gen t 's power is th e a bilit y t o a ch ieve t er ms t h a t a ccru e t o th e ben efit of th e a gen t 's in ter ests. In th is sen se th en , wh en on e cedes h is or h er will t o a con tr a ct , on e's self-in t er est is su br oga t ed t o t h e con t r a ct a n d becom es t h e in t erest of t h e con t r act , or of t h ose wh o en for ce it . Wh er e a con t r act specifies a precise ou t come, t h e u lt im a t e a u th orit y over t h e ma t t er is t r an sfer r ed t o t h e cou r ts, to t h e ext en t t h a t t h ey a r e a ble to en for ce t h e t er m , a n d is n ot h eld by t h e in dividu a l pa r t ies t o t h e con t r a ct . (Th is, of cou r se, is su bject to t h e cost s in volved in br in gin g th e con t r act t o cou r t .) Th r ou gh con t r a ct t h en , t h e a gen ts m a y fin d r ecou r se t o qu it t h e exploitive opposit ion of t h eir fu tu re selves an d en dea vor coopera t ive ven t u r es wit h less fea r of t h e fr ee expr ession of ea ch oth er 's in t erests.
To t h e exten t t h a t a gen cy t h eor y solves t h e pr oblem of a gen cy t h r ou gh con tr a ct design (i.e., com pen sa t ion agr eem en t s), th is is wh a t is m ea n t . Wit h in cen t ive con t r act s, h igh er pa yoffs r esu lt fr om st a t es t h a t a r e m or e fa vor a ble t o t h e oth er pa r t y. In dividu a l will is t h en su bju ga t ed t o t h e con t r a ct a n d dir ect ed t owa r ds t h ese specific en ds.
In a wor ld of per fect an d cost less in for m a tion , a ll of t h e pa r t ies in volved m a y specify precisely th e t erm s of a n a gr eem en t an d th e con t in gen t pa yoffs r esu lt in g fr om all pot en tial st a t es of t h e world. Th is express ex a n t e dist r ibu tion of su rplu s wou ld a ls o allow, given per fect in for m a tion , perfect m on it orin g a n d lega l en for cem en t of ea ch t ediou s det a il of t h e con tr a ct ed t erm s. Th r ou gh per fect con t r a ct in g, th e problem s of expropr ia tion can be a voided. In r ea lit y, h owever , a la r ge propor t ion of t h e con t r act is left u n wr it ten a n d ca n n ot (or is t oo cost ly t o) be wr it t en . (Th is is wh en ce gen er al fidu cia r y du t ies a re der ived.) As a r esu lt , m u ch a ct ivit y a n d n egot ia t ion r esu lt fr om ex post ga p fillin g of u n specified con t r act u al t er m s.
Beca u se of t h e impossibilit y of complete con t r a ctin g an d en for cem en t , t h e pa r ties t o a con t r a ctu al a gr eem en t m u st t h en r et u rn t o t h e perpetu a l con flict of t h eir wa r rin g in t er est s as r egards t h is ga p-fillin g n ecessit y. 22 Th is, in t u rn , deaden s t h e in cen tives for m a kin g u n iqu e, fir m -specific in vest m en t s, wh ile a lso pr omot in g a su spiciou s, fea r some, ca u t iou s a t m osph ere.
Th e pa r t ies t o a n en terprise ma y a gain , h owever , a t t em pt to pu t a n en d t o t h e perpetu a l con flict of t h eir opposed a n d wa r rin g 22. See Williamson supra note 17, at 242 ("joined as they are in an idiosyncratic condition of bilateral monopoly, both buyer and seller are strategically situated to bargain over the disposition of any incremental gain whenever a proposal to adapt is made by the other party. Although both have a long-term interest in effecting adaptations of a joint profit-maximizing kind, each also has an interest in appropriating as much of the gain as he can on each occasion to adapt.") in t erests. To do so, by m u t u al coven a n t , t h ey ca n , t h eor etically, a ppoin t a th ird pa r t y wh o st an ds a bove th e fr ay a n d is empowered t o fill t h e con t r a ct u a l ga ps a t an y a n d a ll fu t u re da t es. Th is n eu t r al, n on pa r t isa n , im per son al a r bit ra t or wou ld be em power ed by each pa r t y's or igin a l power s so as t o t h er eby fill th e con t r a ctu a l gaps it self. In t h is sen se, an d in t h e sam e m a n n er a s don e t h r ou gh con t r a ct , ea ch in dividu a l's self-in t erest ed will is t r a n sfer r ed t o, an d becom es th a t of, t h e a rbit r a t or (or , for in st a n ce, of "t h e corpora t ion "). So lon g a s t h is body, en t it y, for m , pr in ciple, person or per son s -in ot h er words, th e cen tral au th ority-is su fficien t ly empower ed an d st a n ds ou t side of t h e con flict , a n d all par t ies a re a like in a we of its a u t h or it y, t h en , t o t h e pa r t ies wh o for m t h e en t er prise, t h e u lt im a te dist r ibu tion of su rplu s an d valu e becom es ra t h er a con sequ en ce of n ecessit y t h a n of fr eely in t erest ed will. Som et h in g ext ern a l t o t h e con flict is in deed n ecessa r y t o its r esolu t ion . We can n ot even det erm in e wh a t on e h a s r igh t to or sh ou ld h a ve wit h ou t an ext ern al st a n da r d of righ t or sh ou ld . Or der , peace bet ween t h e in t er est s, an d a distr ibu t ion of su rplu s m a y be pr ovided for by t h is so-cr ea ted a u t h or it y. It becomes t h e fin al a r bitr a t or of r esidu a l in t erest s.
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To ba la n ce, proscribe, an d preemp t in dividu a l self-in t er est s, t h e cen t r a l a u th or it y en a ct s it s chosen form of corpor a t e ju stice, wh ere r oles, cu st om , compen sat ion , position s, an d sta tu s a r e, t o va riou s ext en t s, det er min ed im person a lly a n d a bsolu t ely.
In dividu al m em bers of t h e en t erprise wou ld t h en becom e bou n d by th e body t h a t th ey h a ve th u s empowered in th e in st an ce of givin g u p t h eir own self-in t erest . Th e in dividu a l pa r t icipa n ts wit h in t h is fir m wou ld be for ced t o a ccept , as by n ecessit y, th e dicta t es of th is u lt im a t e decision ma ker . Th e ch oice t o t h em becom es pa r t icipa t ion by t h e t er m s pr esen t ed, or n ot t o par t icipa t e a t a ll.
XI. STYLING TH E F IRM
Wh er e r esidu a l con t r ol r igh t s an d u lt ima t e a u t h or it y a re a br oga ted by th e in dividu a ls, t h e en terpr ise ca n th en be st yled so as t o possess som e essen t ial u n it y of pu r pose or coher en t wh olen ess in design . Th e a t omistic qu a lit y of t h e perpet u a l wa r fa r e over su rplu s a m on g th e fir m 's pa r ticipan t s can be t ra n sfor m ed in t o a h a r m on y of plen a r y in t er est . Wh a t for ? F or wh a t pu rpose is t h e dist ribu t ion of su rplu s det er min ed? F or wh a t pu rpose a r e th e r oles of en t er pr ise pa r ticipa n t s deter m in ed? F or wh a t r ea son is a n in dividu al pa id a m ou n t x a n d n ot a m ou n t y? Th e a n swer s t o th ese qu est ion s h elp u s t o see t h e r ole of th is cen tr a l decision m a ker in st ylin g t h e fir m t owa r ds its essen tia l u n it y of pu r pose. On e m ay a n swer t h a t th e fir m is st yled, design ed, a n d given for m by t h e decision s of th e cen t r a l a u th or it y so as to m a xim ize valu e for sh a r eh olders; so as to m a ximize va lu e for a ll of t h e en t er prise p a r ticipan t s ta ken t ogeth er; so a s t o ben efit it s cu stom er s; so a s to m ain t ain t h e in t egrit y of t h e 23. S ee su pra n ot e 1 a n d a ccom pa n yin g t ext .
m a r kets in wh ich it opera t es; or so a s to achieve a n y ot h er object ive. In t h is respect , r ega rdless of t h e pa r ticu la r pu rpose chosen , t h e fir m is given a t eleologica l design th r ou gh a cen t r al decision -ma kin g body t h a t r a t ion a lizes its ot h er wise a t om ist ic or ga n izat ion .
Am on g som e fir ms, t h e in dividu als could develop an am or fati t owa r ds t h is ch osen pu rpose. Wh a t is n ecessit at ed of t h emselves, r equ ir ed in th e n a me of t h e specific object ive, a s a r t icu la ted by t h a t cen t r a l a u th orit y, is n ot wish ed an y differ en t beca u se it can n ot be, a n d beca u se t h e decision s of t h a t body a r e seen n ot a s adversa rial, a r bit ra r y, or self-in t er ested. Th e body is viewed a s on e in t en din g to a ffect a pu rpose t h a t is wor t h wh ile t o a chieve a n d for wh ich decision s a r e ma de. It is in t h is st a t e t h a t a sacr ifice or a ddit ion al bu rden is gla dly ca r ried by an in dividu al m em ber of t h e or ga n iza t ion , a lth ou gh it m a y a ffect t h e dist ribu t ion of su rplu s, possibly t o h is or h er det r im en t , becau se it is requ ir ed of on e in a pa r ticu la r position in a la r ger en ter pr ise wh ose in t er ests a re of a gr ea t er su m th a n on e's own .
By a ccept in g r equ ir ed du t ies, in dividu a ls a id in t h e a chievem en t of th a t wh ich can on ly be a ch ieved in con cer t wit h ot h ers. Th r ou gh th eir pa r ticipa tion , t h ey ca n be pa r t of a n d ga in sa t isfact ion fr om th a t wh ich is u n a t t ain a ble t h r ou gh an in dividu a l's own will a lon e. Th e com m u n ica t ion an d im plemen t a tion of t h is design a r e essen tia l elem en t s of lea der sh ip (wh et h er by CE Os, boa r ds, or a n y ot h er ).
Wh en on e spea ks of a su ccessfu l spor ts t ea m , for in sta n ce, on e is a pt to a llu de t o th is con cept of am or fati bein g derived fr om t h e gr ea t er pu rpose of t h e wh ole. It is oft en sa id t h a t ea ch pla yer on a su ccessfu l t ea m fills a role. Th is pla yer m a y fill a su bordin a t e r ole t o ot h ers, bu t t h is role is given sign ifica n ce a s a n ecessar y pa r t of a coh eren t wh ole. It is det er m in ed by t h e coa ch wh o is given t h e power t o a ffect th e u lt ima t e design of t h e t eam so a s t o a chieve some good. Aga in , it is by t h e sa me a r t a n d prin ciple t h a t an or ch est r a 's effect is a ch ieved ou tside of an y in dividu a l con t r ibu t or 's effor ts. Alon e, t h e woodwin ds, br a ss, per cu ssion , or st rin gs can n ot produ ce t h e ch a r a ct er ist ic effect . Th e in dividu als m u st per form in con cer t . Necessa r y t oo, is th e a lloca t ion of a u th or it y t o pr in cipal pla yer s an d con du ctor s.
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Th er efor e, in dividu a ls ch oose t h eir associat ion with a n en t erpr ise beca u se it is t h eir best a va ila ble opt ion ; t h ey a ccept t h e t er m s given by t h e en t er prise becau se t h ey a r e n ecessa r y an d beca u se th eir in t er est s becom e a lso t h ose of t h e en t erpr ise. In th is m a n n er , sma ll, in dividu a l u n its of power or a bilit y a r e a ggr ega ted in t o t h e la r ger u n it of corpora t e st r en gt h or ca pa bilit y. 24 . S ee Ra gh u r a m G. Ra ja n & Lu igi Zin ga les, T h e Govern an ce of th e N ew E n terprise, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THEORETICAL AND E MP IRICAL P E RSP E CTIVE S 201, 201 (Vives ed., 2000) (discu ssin g a n a n a logou s exa m ple in volvin g a m ovie ca st a n d m ovie dir ect or ).
XII. AUTHORITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Of cou r se, for a compan y, t h e all-ben evolen t , m edit a t in g a u t h or it y does n ot exist . Au th or it y m u st be n est ed in t h e h an ds of in dividu a ls, wh o brin g t h eir own self-in t erest t o t h e en t erprise. Th er e is, t h er efor e, a da n ger th a t th e t eleologica l pu r pose of t h e or der ed en terpr ise is in t h e en d on ly t h a t of th e en r ich m en t or a ggr a n dizem en t of th e pa r t icu lar h older of t h e au t h orit y. We wou ld wit n ess a descen t ba ck t o t h e prim itive, H obbesia n st a t e of a ffairs wit h wh ich we h oped t o escape-on ly n ow with th e addition of n ew pla yer s. As pr otect ion a ga in st th is pot en t ia l, on e u lt im a t ely mu st a ga in r ely u pon lega l r u les an d t h e en for cem en t ca pa bilit ies of ou r cou r ts. Wh er e th er e is decision -m a kin g a u th or it y gr a n t ed t o a board of dir ect ors, corpor a t ion la w sign ifica n tly qu alifies it . Th e direct ors h a ve a bsolu t e a u t h or it y except th at t h ey ca n n ot r ea ppoin t t h em selves (r u le: t h e elect ion of a direct or is depen den t u pon th e a ffir m a tive vot e of a ma jor it y of t h e sh a r eh older s in t h e an n u al m eet in g 25 ); t h ey ca n n ot fla gr an t ly disrega rd th e in t er ests of th e en t ire cla ss of sh a r eh older s (ru le: th e cor por a tion sh ou ld be r u n so a s t o m a xim ize lon g-t erm sh a r eh older valu e); th ey can n ot r efu se to ca ll a m eet in g (ru le: t h e in t ern al pr ocedu r es den ot ed in ar t icles an d byla ws m u st be a dh er ed t o); a n d so on . In th is r espect , a u th orit y, wh ich is n ecessa r y t o coh er en t or gan iza tion , fin ds it s cou n ter ba lan ce in a ccou n t a bilit y t h r ou gh r u les t h a t a r e u lt im a t ely en for ced by cou r ts.
26
Addit ion a lly, t h r ou gh t h e du t y of loyalt y, cor por at e la w seeks t o r epress t h is pot en tia l for self-en r ich m en t in h er en t in th e n ecessa ry vest in g of a u th or it y in t h e officer s a n d dir ect or s wit h in t h e cor por a t ion . It a t t em pts, t h r ou gh t h is r u le, t o cr ea t e disin ter ested fidu cia r ies t h a t ca n t h er efor e st yle a n d or ga n ize t h e fir m for th e ben efit of its st ockh older s an d th e wh ole wit h ou t r ega rd for t h eir own pa r ticu la r priva t e in t er ests. By dema n din g th e u n selfish loya lt y of th ose in wh om a u th orit y mu st be vest ed, t h e la w severs t h e m yria d a ven u es for self-en rich m en t u pon wh ich per son al im pu lses m a y ot h er wise flou rish .
Cor por a t e officer s a n d dir ect or s a r e n ot per m it t ed t o u se t h eir posit ion of t r u st a n d con fiden ce t o fu r t h er t h eir pr iva t e in t er est s. Wh ile t ech n ica lly n ot t r u st ees, t h ey st a n d in a fidu cia r y r ela t ion t o t h e cor por a t ion a n d it s st ock h older s. A pu blic policy, exist in g t h r ou gh t h e yea r s, a n d der ived fr om a pr ofou n d kn owledge of h u m a n ch a r a ct er ist ics a n d m ot ives, h a s 25. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 7.01(a ) (2007) (r equ ir ing a n a n n u a l sh a r eh older s m eet in g); § 7.28(a ) (discu ssin g vot in g for dir ect or s a t t h e a n n u a l m eet in g); cf. J a m es B. St ewa r t , Wh en S h areh old er Dem ocracy is S h am Dem ocracy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr . 12, 2013), h t t p://www.n yt im es.com /2013/04/13/ bu sin ess/sh a m -sh a r eh older -dem ocr a cy.h t m l?pa gewa n t ed=a ll&_r =0.
26. This, of course, allows for the complementary influence of other factors as well, such as reputation, culture and the standards of professionalism. est a blish ed a r u le t h a t dem a n ds of a cor por a t e officer or dir ect or , per em pt or ily a n d in exor a bly, t h e m ost scr u pu lou s obser va n ce of h is du t y . . . . Th e r u le t h a t r equ ir es a n u n divided a n d u n selfish loya lt y t o t h e cor por a t ion dem a n ds t h a t t h er e sh a ll be n o con flict bet ween du t y a n d self-in t er est . 27 By m in imizin g on e's per son a l con n ect ion s t o t h e en ter pr ise an d in t erest in th e decision s bein g ma de, t h e la w ca lls u pon dir ect ors a n d officer s t o a ct fr om ben evolen t in spira t ion . It dema n ds t h at t h eir in t en t n ot be t o en rich t h em selves person a lly, bu t r a t h er t o a ct in a ccor da n ce with th e gen er a l in t erest . Th er efor e, th r ou gh t h e a pplica tion of sta t u t or y ru les a n d t h e imposition of su ch lega l du t ies, t h e ir r evoca ble con flict bet ween a u th orit y an d a ccou n t abilit y is m it iga ted, a n d self-in ter est ed t yr a n n y (au th or it y's progen y) is gu a rded a ga in st .
Addit ion a lly, corpor a t e direct ors a r e pr oh ibit ed , by t h e du t y of loya lt y, fr om u sin g corpor a t e office t o pu rsu e t h eir own self-in t er est t o t h e disa dva n t a ge of t h e corpora t ion a n d its sh a r eh older s. In t h is r espect , r ecogn izin g th a t t h e pu r pose of th e corpora t ion is sh a r eh older va lu e crea t ion , t h e r espon s ibilit y of t h ese fidu cia ries is t o n eu t r a lly pr om ot e t h e cor por a t ion 's in t er est r a th er th an th eir own self-in t er est s.
Th is m a xim h elps en su r e t h e or ga n iza t ion 's efficien cy, wh er eby every decision , wh ich concer n s t h e in dividu al a n d t h e pa r t icu la r , sh ou ld ideally be m ade wit h on ly th e con sider a tion of u tilit y to t h e wh ole. On ly t h e dir ect or s ' a ct ion s t h at ben efit t h e corpora t ion a n d all of it s sh a r eh older s a re per mit t edt h ou gh cor por a t e a ction s t h a t ben efit th e dir ector s as mer ely fellow in vest ors a r e a llowed, provided th er e ar e n o dispropor tion a t e wealth t r a n sfer s to t h em by t h e corpor a tion . So th r ou gh t h e applica t ion of st a t u t or y r u les a n d legal du t ies, t h e con flict bet ween au t h orit y a n d a ccou n t a bilit y is mit iga t ed.
Au t h orit y, n ecessa r y t o coh er en t or ga n iza t ion on t h e on e h a n d, is t emper ed by t h ese proph yla ct ic m ea su r es. Th e in t er con n ected syst ems of power , a u t h orit y, an d a ccou n t a bilit y a r e wh a t we defin e a s gover n a n ce.
XIII. A SUGGESTION CONCERNING LEGITIMACY, COORDINATION AND LEADERSHIP
Wh ile we, a n d a gen cy t h eor y, h a ve described t h e bu sin ess en t erpr ise a s a com bin a t ion of selfish , self-ser vin g in t er est s, a cor por a t ion on ly fu n ction s effect ively by vir tu e of a selfless com m u n ion of it s mem ber s with its pu rposes an d objectives. F or m ost m odern pu blic cor pora t ion s, t h a t pu r pose is, legally, t h e cr ea t ion of sh a r eh older va lu e. It is a r gu ed th a t t h is is fit t in g, 27 . St eph en Ba in br idge, Can Corporate Directors T ak e T h ird Party Pay From H ed ge Fu n d s? P ROF E SSORBAINBRIDGE .COM (Apr . 8, 2013, 9:51 P M), h t t p://www.pr ofessor ba in br idge.com /pr ofessor ba in br idgecom /2013/04/ca n -cor por a t e-dir ect or s-t a ke-t h ir d-pa r t y-pa y-fr om -h edge-fu n ds.h t m l (qu ot in g Gu t h v. Loft , In c., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. Ch . 1939)). a ppr opria t e, a n d desir a ble becau se t h r ou gh t h is focu s, t h e livelih oods a n d h a ppin ess of all wh o pa r t icipa t e in su ch a sh a r eh older -orien t ed econ om y, in gen era l, a r e also gr ea t ly improved.
Br oa d equ it y own er sh ip h as lon g been u sed as an in cen tive device t o a lign t h e in t er ests of a ll of t h e en ter prise's m em bers t owa r ds th e goa l of sh a reh older valu e cr ea t ion . Bu t , viewed solely a s a t ool for proper in cen t ive pr ovision , t h is cou ld n ever be t h e u lt im a t e solu tion t o t h e in h er en t pr oblem of coopera t ive an d join t ven t u res. Rega r dless of t h e ma n n er in wh ich compen sa t ion is st r u ctu r ed, it h a s som e va lu e. Again , if on e pa r ty is t o gain , it is at t h e oth er 's expen se. Th er efore, even with t h is ba lm , t h ere is th e u n a voida ble pr oblem of fin al a lloca tion .
Bu t , broa d-ba sed own er sh ip is st ill, oft en , a good idea. E con omic t h eor y su ggest s a lit a n y of pot en tia l problem s a n d in efficien cies rela t ed t o su ch a plan , r an gin g fr om t h e costs of poor diver sifica tion t o it s bein g a poor , in dir ect m ea su r e of t ask per form a n ce. An d, we su ggest ed ea rlier t h a t equ it y in cen tives, wh ile possibly cr ea tin g va lu e, n on et h eless fa il to a ffect t h e division of va lu e. To a r gu e t h a t br oad -based own ersh ip h a s t h e pot en t ial to "solve" th e a gen cy dilem m a wou ld th er efore appea r t o pr esen t a clea r con t ra dict ion . Wh en viewed fr om t h e perspect ive th a t t h er e is a n or ga n iza tion a l im pera t ive t o "qu it " on e's self-in t erests, h owever , t h e ben efit s t o br oa d equ it y own er sh ip becom e a ppa ren t . 28 A key fu n ct ion of lea dersh ip is n ot on ly t o defin e a n or ga n iza t ion 's st r a t egy a n d object ives, bu t th en also, cr itically, t o com m u n ica t e th em t h r ou gh ou t . Th r ou gh t h is com m u n ica t ion , on e en a bles in dividu als t o u n derst a n d t h eir pr oscr ibed r oles with in t h e en t erpr ise. Th is is u lt im a t ely h ow or ga n iza t ion s a re a ble t o opera t e in con cer t an d coh eren tly. Wh er e t h e pu rpose of a n en t erpr ise is t o ben efit an a n on ym ou s, a morph ou s cla ss of sh ar eh olders, it ca n be difficu lt for lea ders t o com m u n ica te t h e impor t an ce of ach ievin g th is goa l t h r ou gh ou t t h e or ga n iza t ion . (We spea k h ere t o m a n a ger s an d direct ors.) All lea der s elicit su ppor t an d loyalt y by spea kin g in exa lt ed ph ra ses-"Th is pr odu ct will cha n ge th e wor ld!" or "Next gen era t ion !" or "Gr een a n d Global!"-a n d equ it y own er sh ip ma y pr ovide a m ea n in gfu l rh et or ica l t ool, a n d a m or e r ecept ive au dien ce, for t h ose wh ose goa l is, in th e en d, simple m axim ization of sh areh old er valu e. It ma y ju st develop th a t fa mou s am or fati of t h e well-coh er ed or ga n iza t ion a l u n it.
Wh ile we m a y n ever en d t h e wa r of competin g in t erestscer t a in ly th is is t ru e in th e n or m al cou rse of h u ma n even ts -we m ay a t lea st fin d a wa y to make t h e su bordin a t ion of on e 's own pa r ticular in t erests m or e pa lpa ble a n d a ppea lin g so t h a t t h ey m a y t oler ably ser ve a s secon da r y t o th e gen er a l in t erest . H avin g a ch ieved th is, t h e competit ion over su r plu s ma y be m u t ed.
By crea t in g a com m on a lit y of in ter est a m on g t h e wa r rin g pa r ties , we m a y soft en t h e wa r fa r e th a t , a s we ar gu ed, defin es t h e m odern corpor a tion .
Th e la w h a s a t t em pted t o r esolve t h e problem of con flictin g in t erests t h rou gh t h e br oad imposition of fidu cia r y du ties on t h e a gen ts, m ost n ot a bly u pon dir ect ors a n d ma n a ger s, t h e viola t ion of wh ich r esu lt s in som e for m of lega l lia bilit y t o t h e prin cipa l. 29 Th e in effectiven ess of th is rem edy, h owever , la ter led t o t h e dr ive for equ it y own er sh ip by th e a gen ts as th e most effective m ea n s t o cr ea t e a m or e sh a r eh older -r espon sive a gen cy. 30 P er son al wea lt h align m en t bet ween t h e a gen ts a n d prin cipa ls t h r ou gh a com m on alit y of in t erest cr ea t ed by equ ity own ersh ip h a s been th e fa vor ed pa t h for a ddr essin g th e h it h er t o "ir r econ cilable con flict ." 31 Bu t , t h e ben efit is n ot pu rely a ma t t er of pr oper pr ovision of in cen tives. Ra t h er , th ere is a n elem en t of ga in by t h e resu lt an t iden tifica tion wit h th e gen er al good of sh a r eh older va lu e. 32 In th e n ever -en din g com petit ion for su rplu s, su ch widespr ead sh a r eh oldin gs ca n crea te a tr u e comm on a lit y of in t er est for t h e con stit u en t pa r t ies. H er e, t h e poin t of own er sh ip is n ot solely to pr ovide in dividu a l in cen t ive, a s th e a gen cy-t h eor et ic view wou ld con t en d. It a cts t o pr omot e a n d st ren gth en th e willin gn ess of a gen ts t o m a ke th e sa cr ifices t h a t t h eir du t y dem an ds beca u se of a person al iden t ifica tion with t h e goa l of sh a r eh older va lu e a ccr et ion . 33 It can lea d t o a focu sed cu lt u r e t o wh ich all a dh er e-a cu ltu r e of own ersh ip. 34 In su ch a m ilieu , th e in ciden t s of m a lfea sa n ce an d m isfea sa n ce m a y be expected t o d eclin e, a s vigilan ce an d en t h u sia sm a r e m a in ta in ed t h r ou gh ou t t h e or ga n iza t ion . 35 So t oo, fr ict ion s a n d con flicts r esu lt in g fr om t h e wh im s a n d caprice of in dividu a l in t er ests will be expect ed t o declin e-t o t h e or ga n iza t ion 's u lt im a te bet t er m en t , su ccess, a n d th e cr ea tion of lon g-t erm sh a r eh older valu e. 36 In th e n ow-icon ic book T h e Capitalist Man ifesto, 37 Lou is Kelso a n d Mor t imer Adler ca ll for br oad -ba sed employee stock own ersh ip a s on e wa y t o cr ea t e a m or e vibra n t capita list syst em . 38 Th e idea, a dvoca t ed for deca des by Kelso, becam e th e ba sis for th e E mployee St ock Own ersh ip P la n s, or "E SOP s" a s th ey h a ve become com mon ly kn own . 39 Origin a lly, t h e idea was t o cr ea t e a grea ter bridge bet ween la bor a n d m a n a gemen t t h r ou gh sh a r ed own er sh ip goa ls. 40 To t h is en d, it wa s su ggested t h a t a fin an cia l st r u ctu r e be cr ea t ed with in a com pa n y to h old compan y stock for th e ben efit of compa n y em ployees. 41 In 1976, th e t a x code wa s a m en ded t o cr ea t e a pr eferen ce for t h e est a blish m en t of su ch pla n s. 42 Un for t u n a t ely, th e idea n ever a ch ieved th e widespr ead a ccepta n ce t h a t Kelso h ad en vision ed. By t h e m id-1980s, su ch pla n s becam e a h igh ly valu ed a n t i-t a keover device th at pla ced st ock n ot in em ployee h an ds for in cen t ive pu rposes, bu t ga ve m an a ger ia l "t ru stees" votin g con t rol over a la r ge a m ou n t of com pa n y st ock so as t o ma ke it m ore difficult for a h ost ile a cqu ir er t o ga in con t r ol of t h e en t erprise. 43 Br oa d-based equ it y own ersh ip-r a th er t h a n cr ea t in g a u n ifica t ion of in t erest bet ween la bor a n d ca pit a l t o crea t e gr ea t er u lt im a t e econ omic va lu e-h a d degen er a ted in th e E SOP form t o becom e sim ply a m et h od t o en h a n ce m a n a ger ia l capt u re of t h e en t erpr ise. Despite t h is tu r n of even t s, we believe t h a t t h e t h eor y st ill h as m u ch pr omise for a ppr opria t e cor por a t e fu n ct ion .
it is a n en demic pa r t of t h e corpora t e for m an d, for t h a t m a t t er , all h u ma n con du ct . In t h e absen ce of civilit y a n d la ws, t h er e is n o lim it t o t h e clever m ea n s by wh ich m a n will conspir e a ga in st h is or h er fellow m a n , wh et h er fr om wa n t of ga in or merely bor edom . Ou r syst ems of corpor a t e la w sh ou ld a t tempt t o br in g pea ce an d r egu la t ion t o t h ese form er qu a r t er s of su spicion -br oad equ it y own ersh ip is a good complem en t t o su ch effor t s.
